Abstract: We forecast average annual GDP growth for 147 countries for 2010-2030. We use a cross-country regression model where the long-run fundamentals are determined by the countries' accumulated capabilities and the capacity to undergo structural transformation.
I. Introduction
We forecast growth rates for 2010-2030 by estimating a cross-country reduced form conditional-convergence regression, augmented with variables that account for a country's accumulated capabilities and capacity to undergo structural transformation. We define structural transformation as the process by which countries change what they produce and how they do it. It also involves the upgrading and diversification of the production and export baskets. Structural transformation results in shifts in the output and employment structures, away from low-productivity and low-wage activities into high-productivity and high-wage activities. As a consequence, structural transformation is the key for a country to shift from lowincome to high-income.
In recent research, Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2007) argue that while growth and development are the result of structural transformation, not all kinds of activities have the same implications for a country's development prospects. Hausmann et al. (2007) show that the composition of a country's export basket has important consequences for its growth prospects and show that, after controlling for initial income, countries with more sophisticated export baskets grow faster. On these grounds, Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that development should be understood as a process of accumulating more complex sets of capabilities and of finding paths that create incentives for those capabilities to be accumulated and used. The implication is that a sustainable growth trajectory must involve the introduction of new goods and not merely involve continual learning on a fixed set of goods.
In this paper, we use a set of variables that measure a country's capabilities, which we consider to be a fundamental determinant of long-term growth, to forecast long-term growth rates. Specifically, we use: (i) the sophistication level of a country's export basket; (ii) diversification of a country's export basket; and (iii) the size of available opportunities for future growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the forecasting methodology. Section 3 presents the results from the cross-country regression models. Section 4 discusses how values for some of the key variables are projected and presents our growth projections for 147 countries. Section 5 compares our forecasts with those of other studies and discusses if China can achieve an average annual growth are of 8-10% during 2010-2030. We would like to caution against using the approach adopted in this paper to project growth rates for the short-to medium-term. Likewise, we do not attempt to address the shortcomings of the cross-country growth regression approach. Our view is that one can learn from the historical cross-country growth experience, determined by the fundamentals of growth (in our case capabilities), and use the resulting relationship to project long-term growth rates based on the current state of fundamentals.
Methodology and Data
Recently, Carone et al. (2006) , Dadush and Stencil (2010) , Jorgenson and Vu (2008) , and Wilson and Stupnytska (2007) have used the growth accounting methodology to provide estimates of long-term growth. Batista and Zalduendo (2004) and Bloom et al. (2007) have also provided long-term growth rates, but have used cross-country growth regression models. Batista and Zalduendo (2004) use a cross-country regression framework to examine if IMF's medium-term (five-year ahead) projections can be improved by using information on macroeconomic management (such as inflation and fiscal balance), structural variables (such as openness to trade, strength of the financial sector, black market exchange rage premium, and quality of institutions) relevant for projecting medium-term growth, private choices (such as fertility rates which affect labor participation rates), and environmental variables (internal and external shocks). Bloom et al. (2007) also use cross-country regressions to examine if the inclusion of information on the share of the working-age population can improve long-term growth projections.
In this paper, we use a cross-country growth regression to project average annual growth rates for 2010-2030. Our empirical specification follows Barro's (1997) model, according to which growth is inversely related to the initial level of per capita income and positively related to the steady-state level of per capita output. The steady-state income per capita is, in turn, determined by long-run fundamentals. In this paper, we use capabilities as a measure of fundamentals. Specifically, the measures of capabilities used are: (i) the sophistication of a country's export basket; (ii) the diversification of a country's export basket. Specifically, we use the share of "core" commodities in the total number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage, and the growth of this share. Core commodities are chemicals, machinery, and metals; and (iii) the size of available opportunities for future growth, based on the existing set of capabilities.
Our basic specification is as follows: (ii) landlock: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is landlocked and 0 otherwise.
(iii) Life expectancy: Life expectancy and its square.
(iv) Ln (EXPY 1962 ): Log of initial sophistication (EXPY). EXPY captures the ability of a country to export products exported by the rich countries to the extent that, in general, rich-country exports embody higher productivity, wages, and income per capita. EXPY is a weighted average of the sophistication level of the products in the country's export basket. Following , we calculate the level of sophistication of a product (PRODY) as a weighted average of the GDP per capita of the countries that export that product. Algebraically:
where xval ci is the value of country c's exports of commodity i, and GDPpc c is country c's per capita GDP. 1 The level of sophistication of a country's export basket (EXPY) is then calculated as the weighted average of the sophistication of the products exported. Algebraically:
EXPY is also measured in 2005 PPP$ and the measure used is in '000s.
(v) share_core 1962 and (Growth in share_core) : A key insight from Hidalgo et al. (2007) is that a significant presence in the "core" allows a country to shift to other more sophisticated products. Core products are machinery, chemicals, and metals. These are products that, on average, have a high PRODY. They represent 41% of the total number of products that we work with (a total of 779). We use the share of core products exported with revealed comparative advantage in the total number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage (share_core). The average annual growth rate of the share of core products over the period 1962-2007 is also included as an explanatory variable (Growth in share_core). The rationale that underlies our analysis is that technical progress and structural change evolve together (technical progress induces structural change and vice versa; they jointly lead to growth), and underlying both is the mastering of new capabilities. We expect the coefficients of both initial share_core and Growth in share_core to be positive. context is not a physical concept; rather, it measures how close (far) a commodity, not exported presently with revealed comparative advantage, is to the commodities which the country currently exports with revealed comparative advantage. It is a proxy for the probability that a country can successfully export a "new" product (i.e., that it acquires revealed comparative advantage in it). Algebraically: countries export with revealed comparative advantage sophisticated products (e.g., some types of machinery). These products are "close" to many other sophisticated products, for example, other types of machinery, or chemicals, in the sense that there is a high probability that the country can export them successfully (i.e., that it can acquire revealed comparative advantage) because these products use capabilities similar to the ones it already possesses. On the other hand, there are products that are "far" from the current basket (i.e., greater distance and hence low probability that the country acquires revealed comparative advantage in them) and developed countries will probably not export. These products tend to have low sophistication (e.g., natural resources, some agricultural products) and contribute little to open forest.
Therefore, even though developed countries have revealed comparative advantage in the export of a large number of goods, many of the products that they still do not export with revealed comparative advantage are highly sophisticated and the probability of exporting them is high.
Hence the relatively high open forest of these countries.
The opposite is true for the developing countries. Even though they can potentially export many products (those in which they export with revealed comparative advantage) and most of them are sophisticated (e.g., machinery), the probability that these countries export them is low because they do not have the capabilities to do it (i.e., they are from the current export basket).
Hence the low open forest of these economies. Felipe (2010) shows, using a cross-country regression and controlling for the investment-to-GDP ratio and the number of (vii) invest-to-GDP: Investment-to-GDP ratio.
Empirical Results
We have estimated three variants of equation (1) Model 1 includes all the variables in equation (1) except Open Forest (and its square) and the investment-to-GDP ratio. Initial GDP per capita has a negative sign (statistically significant) i.e., countries with a relatively low GDP per capita in 1962 grew faster over the next 45 years. In other words, controlling for other factors, there was conditional convergence among the countries in our sample over the period under consideration. The average annual growth rate of landlocked countries was a little over one percentage point lower than that of countries with access to the sea. Countries with a higher initial life expectancy, signaling a healthier workforce, have grown faster as shown by the positive coefficient of the variable. However, increases in GDP per capita growth derived from higher life expectancy come at a decreasing rate, shown by the negative coefficient on the square of life expectancy.
Initial sophistication is positive and statistically significant. A ten percent increase in the initial level of sophistication adds 0.1 percentage points to the average annual growth rate. The second variable of interest is the initial diversification (share_core). We also use growth in diversification (share_core) to capture the effect on growth of accumulating more complex capabilities. The initial share in the core is measured by the total number of products in the core in which a country has a revealed comparative advantage normalized by the total number of commodities in which the country has a revealed comparative advantage. Our results show that countries with a higher initial share_core, i.e., those with a greater share of acquired complex capabilities at the start of the period, grow faster. A 10 percentage point increase in the share in the core adds 0.4 percentage points to the average annual growth rate. The growth in the share of commodities in the core, i.e., the pace at which more capabilities are added, is also positive and statistically significant. A one percentage point increase in the average annual growth rate of the share of commodities in the core that a country exports with revealed comparative advantage adds 0.25 percentage points to the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita.
Model 2 adds Open Forest and eliminates the Initial Share in the Core. The estimation includes both the level and the square of log Open Forest. 3 All the coefficients carry the expected sign.
Our results show that the coefficient on the log of the Open Forest is negative, whereas the coefficient on the square of log of Open Forest is positive (both are statistically significant). This indicates that the relationship between Open Forest and GDP per capita is U-shaped.
Model 3 adds (on the variable in Model 2) the investment-to-GDP ratio. All coefficients carry the expected sign. Estimation results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio adds 0.03 percentage points to the average annual growth rate.
Generating Growth Projections
Using the estimated coefficients from models 1-3 in table 1, we project average annual GDP per capita growth rates for 2010 -2030. The projected GDP per capita growth rates and average annual population growth rates (the latter taken from the UN Population Division) are used to project GDP growth rates. We need initial values for all variables as well as projections for growth in diversification for 2010-2030 to generate GDP per capita growth rates. Construction of the initial values for each of the variables is explained in table 2. For our key variables, we generate two different scenarios. 3 In unreported regressions, the initial share of commodities in the core was included but was found to be insignificant. should not be interpreted as a collapse or a crisis, but rather as a deceleration in the rate of accumulation of capabilities. 6 We elaborate upon this in the next section.
Our projections also show that India should be able to grow at an average annual growth rate of 5.8%-7% over the period 2010-2030, a growth rate similar to that seen in the past decade. The reasons why India will be able to attain a higher average growth rate than China are as follows:
China has a higher initial per capita income. Recall that countries with a lower initial income per capita grow faster. Even though China has a higher EXPY and share_core than India, the beta coefficients on these two variables are smaller (in absolute terms) than that of initial income per capita. Thus, any positive effects coming from a higher EXPY and share_core are offset by the negative effect of China's higher initial income per capita; and (ii) Open forest and its square have the third highest (in absolute terms) beta coefficient, and the projected value of Open Forest for India in 2010 ($2,490,900) is greater than China's ($2,417,077). This difference is not offset by the effect of life expectancy and its square, which have the highest (in absolute terms) beta coefficients, because of the negative sign on the square of life expectancy.
Our projections indicate that Brazil's average annual growth rate will be in the range 3.6%-4.5%; Mexico's, 3.7%-4.6%; Thailand's, 4.1%-5%; Poland's, 1.3%-2.8%; and Russia, one of the so-called "BRIC" countries, is projected to grow at a low 1.0%-1.2%. 7 Among the industrialized countries, our projections indicate that Germany's growth rate during 2010-30 will be in the range 1.4%-1.9%; Japan's, 0.8%-2.5%; and United States', 2.1%-2.6%.
7 Felipe et al. (2010b) develop an Index of Opportunities and identify China, India, Poland, Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil (in that order) as countries having the most complex and diversified capabilities among the non-high income countries. 1992-2002; 1991-2002. 
Some final considerations
We close the paper with a brief discussion about why most likely China will not be able to achieve an average growth rate of 8-10% in the next 20 years, and with a comparison with the projections provided by other models
Can China achieve an average growth rate of 8%-10% over the next 20 years?
Using our cross-country regression model, we "reverse-engineer" the initial conditions (i.e., the values of the right hand side variables, specifically sophistication, diversification, and open forest) needed for China to achieve an average annual growth rate in the range of 8%-10%. We rely on model 3 which, for China, generates the highest growth projection. Open Forest that we have assumed to achieve a growth rate of 8% is about three-times China's value today, already one of the highest in the world and at the level of the advanced countries.
The implausibility of the projected values of our key variables of interest needed to generate a growth projection of 8% should not be interpreted as a failure (although it may have important consequences for China). Our analysis simply highlights that China will not be able to continue accumulating capabilities at the same rate as in the previous 50 years. This is something to be expected.
Comparison with other long-term growth projections
While there are some studies that forecast long-term GDP growth (for the years 2010-2030 and even beyond), none covers the large sample of countries that we do. Table 4 presents a comparison of our growth projections with projections from the studies of Carone et al. (2006) , Dadush and Stancil (2010) , and Wilson and Stupnytska (2007) .
In general, the top end of our growth projections is similar to that of at least one of these other studies. Our projections are slightly more optimistic for some developed countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. One possible reason for this outcome could be our focus on capabilities. These countries have acquired a very complex and varied set of capabilities, which places them very well to continue growing. In some other cases, such as Hungary, Iran, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, and South Africa, the top end of our growth projections is lower than the growth rate provided by other authors.
Finally, our growth projections for China are comparable to those of other studies; 8 while for India our projections are about a percentage point higher. Our projections are also slightly higher for Brazil, and are similar for Mexico and P 8 Perkins and Rawski (2008) , using a conventional growth accounting framework to forecast China's growth to 2025, also reach the conclusion that it will not be able to achieve an annual growth rate of 9-10%. A more possible scenario, assuming a stable domestic and international political environment, is a 
